Credit: Rose Lincoln/Harvard Staff Photographer Cybersecurity expert and Berkman Klein fellow Bruce Schneier talked to the Gazette about what consumers can do to protect themselves from government and corporate surveillance.
6.1 We hold information about suppliers to enable us to contact you. 6.2 The personal information we hold is your name, job title, and maybe your work email address. 6.3 We will continue to hold your personal details for two years after your last invoice with us. Express VPN Best for privacy. Number of IP addresses: 30,000 Number of servers: 3,000+ 3 months free with 1-year plan. In an interview with the Harvard Gazette, cybersecurity expert Bruce Schneier, a fellow with the Berkman Klein Center for Internet & Society and the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard Kennedy School, talked about government and corporate surveillance, and about what concerned users can do to protect their privacy. 4.6 billion $16.8 billion. Records exposed as a result of data breaches in the first half of 2018. Stolen from us consumers in 2018 data breaches. We are working to earn your trust every day by focusing on six key privacy principles: Control: We will put you in control of your privacy with easy-to-use tools and clear choices. Transparency: We will be transparent about data collection and use so you can make informed decisions. Security: We will protect the data you entrust to us through strong security and encryption.
In the internet era, consumers seem increasingly resigned to giving up fundamental aspects of their privacy for convenience in using their phones and computers, and have grudgingly accepted that being monitored by corporations and even governments is just a fact of modern life.
In fact, internet users in the United States have fewer privacy protections than those in other countries. In April, Congress voted to allow internet service providers to collect and sell their customers' browsing data. By contrast, the European Union hit Google this summer with a $2.7 billion antitrust fine.
To assess the internet landscape, the Gazette interviewed cybersecurity expert Bruce Schneier, a fellow with the Berkman Klein Center for Internet & Society and the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard Kennedy School. Schneier talked about government and corporate surveillance, and about what concerned users can do to protect their privacy. Emailextractorpro.com serial key.
GAZETTE: After whistleblower Edward Snowden's revelations concerning the National Security Agency's (NSA) mass surveillance operation in 2013, how much has the government landscape in this field changed?
SCHNEIER: Snowden's revelations made people aware of what was happening, but little changed as a result. The USA Freedom Act resulted in some minor changes in one particular government data-collection program. The NSA's data collection hasn't changed; the laws limiting what the NSA can do haven't changed; the technology that permits them to do it hasn't changed. It's pretty much the same.
GAZETTE: Should consumers be alarmed by this?
SCHNEIER: People should be alarmed, both as consumers and as citizens. But today, what we care about is very dependent on what is in the news at the moment, and right now surveillance is not in the news. It was not an issue in the 2016 election, and by and large isn't something that legislators are willing to make a stand on. Snowden told his story, Congress passed a new law in response, and people moved on.
GAZETTE: What about corporate surveillance? How pervasive is it?
SCHNEIER: Surveillance is the business model of the internet. Everyone is under constant surveillance by many companies, ranging from social networks like Facebook to cellphone providers. This data is collected, compiled, analyzed, and used to try to sell us stuff. Personalized advertising is how these companies make money, and is why so much of the internet is free to users. We're the product, not the customer.
GAZETTE: Should they be stopped?
SCHNEIER: That's a philosophical question. Personally, I think that in many cases the answer is yes. It's a question of how much manipulation we allow in our society. Right now, the answer is basically anything goes. It wasn't always this way. In the 1970s, Congress passed a law to make a particular form of subliminal advertising illegal because it was believed to be morally wrong. That advertising technique is child's play compared to the kind of personalized manipulation that companies do today. The legal question is whether this kind of cyber-manipulation is an unfair and deceptive business practice, and, if so, can the Federal Trade Commission step in and prohibit a lot of these practices.
GAZETTE: Why doesn't the commission do that? Why is this intrusion happening, and nobody does anything about it?
SCHNEIER: We're living in a world of low government effectiveness, and there the prevailing neo-liberal idea is that companies should be free to do what they want. Our system is optimized for companies that do everything that is legal to maximize profits, with little nod to morality. Shoshana Zuboff, professor at the Harvard Business School, invented the term 'surveillance capitalism' to describe what's happening. It's very profitable, and it feeds off the natural property of computers to produce data about what they are doing. For example, cellphones need to know where everyone is so they can deliver phone calls. As a result, they are ubiquitous surveillance devices beyond the wildest dreams of Cold War East Germany.
GAZETTE: But Google and Facebook face more restrictions in Europe than in the United States. Why is that?
SCHNEIER: Europe has more stringent privacy regulations than the United States. In general, Americans tend to mistrust government and trust corporations. Europeans tend to trust government and mistrust corporations. The result is that there are more controls over government surveillance in the U.S. than in Europe. On the other hand, Europe constrains its corporations to a much greater degree than the U.S. does. U.S. law has a hands-off way of treating internet companies. Computerized systems, for example, are exempt from many normal product-liability laws. This was originally done out of the fear of stifling innovation.
GAZETTE: It seems that U.S. customers are resigned to the idea of giving up their privacy in exchange for using Google and Facebook for free. What's your view on this?
SCHNEIER: The survey data is mixed. Consumers are concerned about their privacy and don't like companies knowing their intimate secrets. But they feel powerless and are often resigned to the privacy invasions because they don't have any real choice. People need to own credit cards, carry cellphones, and have email addresses and social media accounts. That's what it takes to be a fully functioning human being in the early 21st century. This is why we need the government to step in.
GAZETTE: You're one of the most well-known cybersecurity experts in the world. What do you do to protect your privacy online?
SCHNEIER: I don't have any secret techniques. I do the same things everyone else does, and I make the same tradeoffs that everybody else does. I bank online. I shop online. I carry a cellphone, and it's always turned on. I use credit cards and have airline frequent flier accounts. Perhaps the weirdest thing about my internet behavior is that I'm not on any social media platforms. That might make me a freak, but honestly it's good for my productivity. In general, security experts aren't paranoid; we just have a better understanding of the trade-offs we're doing. Like everybody else, we regularly give up privacy for convenience. We just do it knowingly and consciously.
GAZETTE: What else do you do to protect your privacy online? Do you use encryption for your email?
SCHNEIER: I have come to the conclusion that email is fundamentally insecurable. If I want to have a secure online conversation, I use an encrypted chat application like Signal. By and large, email security is out of our control. For example, I don't use Gmail because I don't want Google having all my email. Avira antivirus pro 4 0 2 24. But last time I checked, Google has half of my email because you all use Gmail.
GAZETTE: What does Google know about you?
SCHNEIER: Google's not saying because they know it would freak people out. But think about it, Google knows quite a lot about all of us. No one ever lies to a search engine. I used to say that Google knows more about me than my wife does, but that doesn't go far enough. Google knows me even better, because Google has perfect memory in a way that people don't.
GAZETTE: Is Google the 'Big Brother?'
SCHNEIER: 'Big Brother' in the Orwellian sense meant big government. That's not Google, and that's not even the NSA. What we have is many 'Little Brothers': Google, Facebook, Verizon, etc. They have enormous amounts of data on everybody, and they want to monetize it. They don't want to respect your privacy.
GAZETTE: In your book 'Data and Goliath: The Hidden Battles to Collect Your Data and Control Your World,' you recommend a few strategies for people to protect their privacy online. Which one is the most effective?
SCHNEIER: Unfortunately, we live in a world where most of our data is out of our control. It's in the cloud, stored by companies that may not have our best interests at heart. So, while there are technical strategies people can employ to protect their privacy, they're mostly around the edges. The best recommendation I have for people is to get involved in the political process. The best thing we can do as consumers and citizens is to make this a political issue. Force our legislators to change the rules.
Opting out doesn't work. It's nonsense to tell people not to carry a credit card or not to have an email address. And 'buyer beware' is putting too much onus on the individual. People don't test their food for pathogens or their airlines for safety. The government does it. But the government has failed in protecting consumers from internet companies and social media giants. But this will come around. The only effective way to control big corporations is through big government. My hope is that technologists also get involved in the political process — in government, in think-tanks, universities, and so on. That's where the real change will happen. I tend to be short-term pessimistic and long-term optimistic. I don't think this will do society in. This is not the first time we've seen technological changes that threaten to undermine society, and it won't be the last.
Credit: Rose Lincoln/Harvard Staff Photographer Cybersecurity expert and Berkman Klein fellow Bruce Schneier talked to the Gazette about what consumers can do to protect themselves from government and corporate surveillance.
6.1 We hold information about suppliers to enable us to contact you. 6.2 The personal information we hold is your name, job title, and maybe your work email address. 6.3 We will continue to hold your personal details for two years after your last invoice with us. Express VPN Best for privacy. Number of IP addresses: 30,000 Number of servers: 3,000+ 3 months free with 1-year plan. In an interview with the Harvard Gazette, cybersecurity expert Bruce Schneier, a fellow with the Berkman Klein Center for Internet & Society and the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard Kennedy School, talked about government and corporate surveillance, and about what concerned users can do to protect their privacy. 4.6 billion $16.8 billion. Records exposed as a result of data breaches in the first half of 2018. Stolen from us consumers in 2018 data breaches. We are working to earn your trust every day by focusing on six key privacy principles: Control: We will put you in control of your privacy with easy-to-use tools and clear choices. Transparency: We will be transparent about data collection and use so you can make informed decisions. Security: We will protect the data you entrust to us through strong security and encryption.
In the internet era, consumers seem increasingly resigned to giving up fundamental aspects of their privacy for convenience in using their phones and computers, and have grudgingly accepted that being monitored by corporations and even governments is just a fact of modern life.
In fact, internet users in the United States have fewer privacy protections than those in other countries. In April, Congress voted to allow internet service providers to collect and sell their customers' browsing data. By contrast, the European Union hit Google this summer with a $2.7 billion antitrust fine.
To assess the internet landscape, the Gazette interviewed cybersecurity expert Bruce Schneier, a fellow with the Berkman Klein Center for Internet & Society and the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard Kennedy School. Schneier talked about government and corporate surveillance, and about what concerned users can do to protect their privacy. Emailextractorpro.com serial key.
GAZETTE: After whistleblower Edward Snowden's revelations concerning the National Security Agency's (NSA) mass surveillance operation in 2013, how much has the government landscape in this field changed?
SCHNEIER: Snowden's revelations made people aware of what was happening, but little changed as a result. The USA Freedom Act resulted in some minor changes in one particular government data-collection program. The NSA's data collection hasn't changed; the laws limiting what the NSA can do haven't changed; the technology that permits them to do it hasn't changed. It's pretty much the same.
GAZETTE: Should consumers be alarmed by this?
SCHNEIER: People should be alarmed, both as consumers and as citizens. But today, what we care about is very dependent on what is in the news at the moment, and right now surveillance is not in the news. It was not an issue in the 2016 election, and by and large isn't something that legislators are willing to make a stand on. Snowden told his story, Congress passed a new law in response, and people moved on.
GAZETTE: What about corporate surveillance? How pervasive is it?
SCHNEIER: Surveillance is the business model of the internet. Everyone is under constant surveillance by many companies, ranging from social networks like Facebook to cellphone providers. This data is collected, compiled, analyzed, and used to try to sell us stuff. Personalized advertising is how these companies make money, and is why so much of the internet is free to users. We're the product, not the customer.
GAZETTE: Should they be stopped?
SCHNEIER: That's a philosophical question. Personally, I think that in many cases the answer is yes. It's a question of how much manipulation we allow in our society. Right now, the answer is basically anything goes. It wasn't always this way. In the 1970s, Congress passed a law to make a particular form of subliminal advertising illegal because it was believed to be morally wrong. That advertising technique is child's play compared to the kind of personalized manipulation that companies do today. The legal question is whether this kind of cyber-manipulation is an unfair and deceptive business practice, and, if so, can the Federal Trade Commission step in and prohibit a lot of these practices.
GAZETTE: Why doesn't the commission do that? Why is this intrusion happening, and nobody does anything about it?
SCHNEIER: We're living in a world of low government effectiveness, and there the prevailing neo-liberal idea is that companies should be free to do what they want. Our system is optimized for companies that do everything that is legal to maximize profits, with little nod to morality. Shoshana Zuboff, professor at the Harvard Business School, invented the term 'surveillance capitalism' to describe what's happening. It's very profitable, and it feeds off the natural property of computers to produce data about what they are doing. For example, cellphones need to know where everyone is so they can deliver phone calls. As a result, they are ubiquitous surveillance devices beyond the wildest dreams of Cold War East Germany.
GAZETTE: But Google and Facebook face more restrictions in Europe than in the United States. Why is that?
SCHNEIER: Europe has more stringent privacy regulations than the United States. In general, Americans tend to mistrust government and trust corporations. Europeans tend to trust government and mistrust corporations. The result is that there are more controls over government surveillance in the U.S. than in Europe. On the other hand, Europe constrains its corporations to a much greater degree than the U.S. does. U.S. law has a hands-off way of treating internet companies. Computerized systems, for example, are exempt from many normal product-liability laws. This was originally done out of the fear of stifling innovation.
GAZETTE: It seems that U.S. customers are resigned to the idea of giving up their privacy in exchange for using Google and Facebook for free. What's your view on this?
SCHNEIER: The survey data is mixed. Consumers are concerned about their privacy and don't like companies knowing their intimate secrets. But they feel powerless and are often resigned to the privacy invasions because they don't have any real choice. People need to own credit cards, carry cellphones, and have email addresses and social media accounts. That's what it takes to be a fully functioning human being in the early 21st century. This is why we need the government to step in.
GAZETTE: You're one of the most well-known cybersecurity experts in the world. What do you do to protect your privacy online?
SCHNEIER: I don't have any secret techniques. I do the same things everyone else does, and I make the same tradeoffs that everybody else does. I bank online. I shop online. I carry a cellphone, and it's always turned on. I use credit cards and have airline frequent flier accounts. Perhaps the weirdest thing about my internet behavior is that I'm not on any social media platforms. That might make me a freak, but honestly it's good for my productivity. In general, security experts aren't paranoid; we just have a better understanding of the trade-offs we're doing. Like everybody else, we regularly give up privacy for convenience. We just do it knowingly and consciously.
GAZETTE: What else do you do to protect your privacy online? Do you use encryption for your email?
SCHNEIER: I have come to the conclusion that email is fundamentally insecurable. If I want to have a secure online conversation, I use an encrypted chat application like Signal. By and large, email security is out of our control. For example, I don't use Gmail because I don't want Google having all my email. Avira antivirus pro 4 0 2 24. But last time I checked, Google has half of my email because you all use Gmail.
GAZETTE: What does Google know about you?
SCHNEIER: Google's not saying because they know it would freak people out. But think about it, Google knows quite a lot about all of us. No one ever lies to a search engine. I used to say that Google knows more about me than my wife does, but that doesn't go far enough. Google knows me even better, because Google has perfect memory in a way that people don't.
GAZETTE: Is Google the 'Big Brother?'
SCHNEIER: 'Big Brother' in the Orwellian sense meant big government. That's not Google, and that's not even the NSA. What we have is many 'Little Brothers': Google, Facebook, Verizon, etc. They have enormous amounts of data on everybody, and they want to monetize it. They don't want to respect your privacy.
GAZETTE: In your book 'Data and Goliath: The Hidden Battles to Collect Your Data and Control Your World,' you recommend a few strategies for people to protect their privacy online. Which one is the most effective?
SCHNEIER: Unfortunately, we live in a world where most of our data is out of our control. It's in the cloud, stored by companies that may not have our best interests at heart. So, while there are technical strategies people can employ to protect their privacy, they're mostly around the edges. The best recommendation I have for people is to get involved in the political process. The best thing we can do as consumers and citizens is to make this a political issue. Force our legislators to change the rules.
Opting out doesn't work. It's nonsense to tell people not to carry a credit card or not to have an email address. And 'buyer beware' is putting too much onus on the individual. People don't test their food for pathogens or their airlines for safety. The government does it. But the government has failed in protecting consumers from internet companies and social media giants. But this will come around. The only effective way to control big corporations is through big government. My hope is that technologists also get involved in the political process — in government, in think-tanks, universities, and so on. That's where the real change will happen. I tend to be short-term pessimistic and long-term optimistic. I don't think this will do society in. This is not the first time we've seen technological changes that threaten to undermine society, and it won't be the last.
This interview appeared in the Harvard Gazette on August 24, 2017. It was edited by the publication for length and clarity.
SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (Draft)
Date Published:February 23, 2016
Comments Due:April 1, 2016 (public comment period is CLOSED)
Email Questions to:sec-cert@nist.gov
Announcement
NIST Special Publication 800-53 Revision 5, Pre-Draft Call for Comments
Recognizing the importance of maintaining the relevance and currency of Special Publication (SP) 800-53, NIST will update Revision 4 to Revision 5 during calendar year 2016 beginning with this pre-draft request for comments. NIST seeks the input of SP 800-53 customers to ensure Revision 5 will continue to deliver a comprehensive security and privacy control set that addresses current threats, technologies, and environments of operation while remaining functional and usable. Listed below are the specific areas in which NIST seeks comments, but any constructive feedback will be considered.
Security Control Baseline Normalization
The low, moderate, and high security control baselines in SP 800-53 Appendix D were developed to ensure consistency with Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) 199 and FIPS 200 along with NIST SP 800-60 and the assumptions detailed in SP 800-53 Revision 4, Section 3.1. In accordance with the Federal Information Security Management/Modernization Acts of 2002/2014, the security control baselines provide a starting point for a tailoring process that results in an agreed upon set of security controls that are intended to provide protections commensurate with the risk resulting from the unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of information and information systems.
NIST seeks customer feedback regarding the relevance and appropriateness of the current security controls and control enhancements designated in each baseline—that is, do the security controls and control enhancements in each baseline provide the appropriate starting point for tailoring that baseline? Specifically, NIST requests input on the following:
- Security controls or control enhancements currently designated in baselines that customers believe are not appropriate for a given baseline, along with a rationale for the removal of the controls or enhancements. Why are the particular security controls or control enhancements notneeded to protect the information and information system at the level of a particular baseline?
Example: Remove CP-4, Contingency Plan Testing from the Low Impact Baseline because it should not be necessary to expend resources on testing contingency plans for low impact systems due to the limited adverse effect of the loss of a low impact system to the organization's mission. - Security controls or control enhancements not currently designated in a baseline that customers believe are appropriate for a given baseline, along with a rationale for the addition of the controls or enhancements. Why are the particular security controls or control enhancements needed to protect information and information system at the level of a particular baseline?
Example: Add AC-11, Session Lock to the Low Impact Baseline because if an attacker has physical access to a low impact system that has not been locked, the system could be used to attack other, potentially higher impact systems on the same network.
Security Control Format
Currently, each security control and control enhancement begins with an indication of the entity within which or by which the control/enhancement is to be implemented, for example: 'the information system provides a warning..' or 'the organization reviews and updates the audited events…' NIST seeks input regarding a proposed change in the existing format such that each security control and control enhancement would be stated in an outcome-based manner, for example: 'a warning is provided..' or 'the audited events are reviewed and updated..'
Example:
Current—
AU-14 SESSION AUDIT
Control: The information system provides the capability for authorized users to select a user session to capture/record or view/hear.
Proposed—
AU-14 SESSION AUDIT
Control: The capability for authorized users to select a user session to capture/record or view/hear is provided.
Example:
Current—
MA-6 TIMELY MAINTENANCE
Control: The organization obtains maintenance support and/or spare parts for [Assignment: organization-defined information system components] within [Assignment: organization-defined time period] of failure.
Proposed—
MA-6 TIMELY MAINTENANCE
Control: Maintenance support and/or spare parts are obtained for [Assignment: organization-defined information system components] within [Assignment: organization-defined time period] of failure.
This change is being considered to keep the focus on the substance of the security control or control enhancement rather than on the entity implementing the control/enhancement. Would such a change provide greater emphasis on the purpose of the control and better reflect the intended outcome of the control in providing security that is commensurate with risk? Or provide organizations with greater flexibility regarding specific control implementations? Please note that this change, if adopted, would not alter the current content of any security control or control enhancement.
Addition of hyperlinks
NIST is considering the inclusion of hyperlinks throughout the document to make the guidance easier to navigate. For example, each security control in the left hand column in the Appendix D tables could be hyperlinked to the actual control in Appendix F. Would this type of change be a constructive addition or would such a change add complexity and clutter while not contributing any real benefit?
Addition of key words
NIST is considering the inclusion of keywords for each security control and control enhancement. This addition would facilitate searching when developing or using automated tools. The addition of keywords may promote greater consistency in search results since automated tool developers would use the same keywords for each security control or control enhancement. Would the addition of keywords be a constructive addition or would the addition of keywords add unnecessary complexity without sufficient benefit? The relevant keywords could be included after the References as in the example below.
Example:
Privatus 6 0 – Automated Privacy Protection Privacy Fence
IA-6 AUTHENTICATOR FEEDBACK
Control: The information system obscures feedback of authentication information during the authentication process to protect the information from possible exploitation/use by unauthorized individuals.
Supplemental Guidance: The feedback from information systems does not provide information that would allow unauthorized individuals to compromise .. Related control: PE-18. Iffmpeg 2 3 intelserial download free.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: None.
Keywords: access; confidentiality; output device; physical.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
Comments or suggestions for additional information
NIST seeks input regarding the comprehensiveness of the current publication including security and privacy controls; control enhancements; supplemental guidance; informative text in Chapters 1-3; and supporting appendices. Are there any security or privacy controls or control enhancements needed but not addressed by the control sets in Appendices F, G, and J? Is additional supplemental guidance needed for any control or control enhancement? Is further informative text needed in Chapters 1-3? Is there any information missing from the supporting appendices or are additional appendices needed? Please be specific and include the rationale for any proposed additions.
Comments or suggestions for clarification of information
Privatus 6 0 – Automated Privacy Protection Privacy Protection
NIST seeks input regarding the clarity of the current publication including security and privacy controls; control enhancements; supplemental guidance; informative text in Chapters 1-3; and supporting appendices. Is the intent of any security or privacy control or enhancement unclear or confusing? Does the associated supplemental guidance explain the intent of the control or control enhancement clearly and unambiguously? Are there sufficient examples? Is the informative text in Chapters 1-3 and the supporting appendices presented with sufficient clarity? Please be specific and include the rationale for any proposed clarifications.
Comments or suggestions for removal of information
NIST seeks input regarding the need to remove material from the current publication including security and privacy controls; control enhancements; supplemental guidance; informative text in Chapters 1-3; and supporting appendices. Are there any security or privacy controls in Appendices F, G, and J that are outdated, unneeded, or unusable? Is there supplemental guidance for security or privacy controls or control enhancements that is not helpful or is extraneous? Is there information in Chapters 1-3 or the supporting appendices that is irrelevant or not useful? Is information in any of the appendices ineffective or immaterial? Please be specific and include the rationale for any proposed deletions.
Abstract
Privatus 6 0 – Automated Privacy Protection Privacy Window Film
None selected
Documentation
Privatus 6 0 – Automated Privacy Protection Privacy Concerns
Publication:
None available
Supplemental Material:
None available
Document History:
02/23/16: SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (Draft)
08/15/17: SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (Draft)
03/16/20: SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (Draft)
09/23/20: SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (Final)
